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Labor Earnings, Discrimination, and 
the Racial Composition of Jobs 
Barry To Hirsch 
Edward J o Schumacher 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the effect of the racial composition of labor 
markets on wage rates and the racial wage gap. The wage rates 
of white as well as black workers are significantly lower in indus­
try-occupation-regional groups with high densities of black work­
ers, while the racial wage gap does not vary systematically with 
respect to racial density. Interpretation of racial gap estimates 
can be sensitive to inclusion of a racial density variable, particu­
larly in sparse specifications. An explanation for the wage­
density relationship cannot be established, but results are most 
consistent with a quality sorting explanation and, to a lesser ex­
tent, the crowding hypothesis. 
I. Introduction 
There has been extensive study of racial wage differentials 
and labor market discrimination, yet scant attention has been given to 
how wage rates vary with the racial composition of jobs. This paper 
explores the extent to which the wages of black and white workers, and 
the racial wage gap, differ with respect to the proportion of black workers 
in a labor market. Such a study has value for at least three reasons. First, 
Barry T. Hirsch is a professor of economics and Edward J. Schumacher is a graduate 
student at Florida State University in Tallahassee. They appreciate helpful comments 
from Mark Berger, William R. Johnson, Kevin Lang, David Macpherson, James Ragan, 
Andrew Weiss, anonymous referees, and discussants at the 1990 American and Southern 
Economic Association meetings. The data used in this article can be obtained beginning 
in March 1993 through March 1996 from the authors at the following address: Depart­
ment of Economics R-128, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306-2045. 
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evidence on whether black and white wages vary systematically with 
racial composition is interesting in its own right. Second, we provide 
information as to how traditional estimates and interpretation of wage 
discrimination are affected by consideration of racial composition. Fi­
nally, the relationship between black and white wages and the racial 
composition of jobs facilitates an appraisal of alternative theories of labor 
market discrimination, thus shedding light on what is a major lacuna in 
the literature (Cain 1986, p. 709). 
Previous evidence on the relationship of wages and the racial composi­
tion of labor markets is limited.' The two studies most closely related to 
ours are Ragan and Tremblay (1988) and Sorensen (1989). Ragan and 
Tremblay (1988) review the limited literature on employee discrimination 
and test for it using the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) youth cohort 
of workers ages 15-23. The NLS contains information on the presence 
of an integrated workforce, the race and sex of the immediate supervisor, 
and the percentage of the immediate workforce of a different race and 
sex. Ragan and Tremblay conclude that there is evidence of employee 
discrimination with respect to race, based on the finding of higher wages 
for whites in integrated work environments. More closely related to evi­
dence presented here, Ragan and Tremblay find that white male and 
female wages decrease as the percentage of the immediate workforce of 
a different race increases, while black male wages increase as the percent­
age not black increases (the former results are not statistically significant; 
the latter marginly significant). They place little emphasis on these latter 
results, however. 
In a comprehensive study on occupational segregation by sex and race, 
Sorensen (1989) matches information from the 1980 Census of Population 
on the racial density of occupations to individual data from the Current 
Population Survey and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. She finds 
that the wages of white males decrease as the racial density of an occupa­
tion increases, but finds little systematic relationship between racial den­
sity and wages among other demographic groups. Because this relation­
ship is not the focus of the paper, she provides only limited analysis and 
discussion of these results. 
1. Cain (1986) provides a detailed survey and analysis of the theoretical and empirical 
literature on racial discrimination. Chiswick (1973) uses state data to examine the relation­
ship between racial composition and white earnings dispersion, while Reich (1978) relates 
white income inequality across labor markets to black-white income ratios. We discovered 
Sorensen (1989) following completion of an earlier version of this paper. Studies using a 
methodology similar to ours have examined the impact of the proportion female on the 
wages of female and male workers, and of union density on the wages of union and nonunion 
workers. 
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In this study, a racial density variable constructed from the 1980 Cen­
sus of Population is matched with Current Population Survey data to 
explore the relationship of racial density with black and white wages and 
estimates of the racial gap. Our study has advantages and disadvantages 
as compared to the analyses by Ragan and Tremblay and by Sorensen. 
The racial composition variables available to Ragan and Tremblay from 
the NLS directly measure the racial makeup in an individual's workplace 
and, thus, are particularly well designed to test for employee discrimina­
tion and to minimize measurement error associated with the matching of 
aggregate density measures to individual workers. Ragan and Tremblay's 
analysis is limited because data are available only on young workers ages 
15-23 and because sample sizes are relatively small. As will be seen, 
care must be exercised in generalizing results from a small youth sample 
to the larger population. 
Our analysis and data have much in common with those in Sorensen. 
We construct a racial composition variable, however, that measures ra­
cial density within industry-occupation-region (lOR) cells (say, a machine 
operator in the textile industry in the South), whereas Sorensen measures 
density by occupation only. Our measure corresponds more closely to 
the concept of a labor market, although we are unable to provide as 
detailed an occupational breakdown. Whereas we find average racial den­
sity in lOR groups to be twice as large for black as for white workers, 
Sorensen (1989, Appendix B, p. 63) finds occupational black density to 
be only moderately larger for black than for white workers. 
In Section II, construction of the dataset is explained and descriptive 
evidence is provided. In Section III, wage equations estimated separately 
by racial! gender group provide evidence on the relationship of wages and 
wage gaps with the racial composition of jobs. Interpretation of results 
and an appraisal of discrimination models in light of the evidence are 
provided in Section IV. 
II. Data and Descriptive Evidence on Racial 
Density and Wages 
Two primary data sources are used in the paper. Individual 
data on hourly earnings, individual characteristics, job characteristics, 
and region are obtained from the combined May-June Current Population 
Surveys (CPS) for 1983, including the pension supplement containing 
information on individuals' tenure on their current job and on firm and 
establishment size (similar surveys are available for 1979 and 1988). Our 
wage equation sample includes all white and black workers between 16 
and 64 with positive weekly earnings and hours worked per week and 
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complete data for all individual and job characteristics. Workers whose 
race is designated as "other" are not included in the sample since their 
numbers are relatively small and this group exhibits substantial hetero­
geneity. 
A racial density variable, DEN, measuring the ratio of black to the sum 
of white and black workers in a labor market, is matched to each worker 
in the CPS sample.2 These data are derived from the 1980 Census of 
Population and are defined for 14 industry (I) groups cross-classified by 
67 occupational (0) groups cross-classified by the four major Census 
regions (R), for a total of 3,752 lOR cells (U. S. Department of Commerce 
1984, Part 1, Section 3, Table 327). Use of the Census of Population 
guarantees the largest possible sample sizes. A number of the lOR cells 
are small or empty and have no matching counterparts in the CPS sample. 
The sample sizes in the matched cells range from a low of 343 to a high 
of 1,731,779 (six individuals in the CPS matched to lOR cells with be­
tween 17 and 172 workers are dropped from our sample). Although guided 
in large part by data availability and sample size, our designation of a 
labor market corresponds closely to an economic definition, being defined 
rather finely along occupational lines and more broadly by industry and 
region.3 
Sample sizes for the four demographic groups are 10,776 white males, 
811 black males, 9,016 white females, and 963 black females. Mean DEN 
values (standard deviations) for the four groups are .083 (.071), .168 
(.116), .098 (.078), and .198 (.159), respectively. Table 1 presents mean 
values of worker characteristics variables for the four racial/ gender 
groups, in total and separately by four DEN categories. It is clear from 
Table 1 that wages for white and black males decrease markedly with 
respect to racial density. The wage-density pattern for females is similar, 
although less clear-cut. Some of this decrease is accounted for by differ­
ences in years of schooling, which decrease with respect to DEN. On the 
other hand, experience tends to increase with DEN. Because individual 
characteristics differ with respect to racial composition, regression analy­
sis is necessary to estimate the extent to which wage differentials associ­
ated with DEN can and cannot be accounted for by differences in measur­
able characteristics. 
2. DEN approximates but does not equal the proportion of black workers in a labor market, 
since nonwhite, nonblacks are excluded. The same DEN values are matched to males and 
females working in identical lOR groups. 
3. A labor market typiCally is thought to be defined on the basis of skill types (occupation) 
within geographic areas (regions) across which mobility is limited. For evidence that system­
atic long-run wage differentials also exist across industries, see, among others, Dickens and 
Katz (1987) and Krueger and Summers (1987). 
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Table 1 I� Means of Variables by Demographic Group and Racial Density Category 
c:: ""! 
0 ::::; DEN ::::; .05 .05 < DEN ::::; .08 .08 <DEN ::::; .13 DEN > .13 All I� 
0 
,....., 
White males ::c: c:: 
DEN 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.20 0.08 s 
Hourly earnings 10.61 9.77 8.83 7.59 9.52 P' ::s 
Schooling 13.56 13.15 12.24 12.05 12.94 :::0 � 
Experience 17.72 18.80 19.81 18.45 18.52 00 0 
Tenure 7.40 8.56 8.74 6.70 7.82 c:: ""! 
Union 0.19 0.33 0.38 0.31 0.28 () � 00 
Married 0.69 0.69 0.68 0.64 0.68 
Full time 0.92 0.91 0.93 0.86 0.91 
Large SMSA 0.38 0.37 0.33 0.28 0.35 
n 4,106 2,679 2,073 1,918 10,776 
Black males 
DEN 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.25 0.17 
Hourly earnings 10.40 9.18 7.89 6.44 7.55 
Schooling 13.65 12.74 11.42 11.07 11.64 
Experience 18.57 20.25 21.47 22.25 21.43 
Tenure 7.08 8.16 8.34 7.91 7.96 
Union 0.36 0.38 0.45 0.39 0.40 
Married 0.58 0.57 0.58 0.55 0.56 
Full time 0.91 0.90 0.87 0.88 0.88 
Large SMSA 0.61 0.70 0.53 0.41 0.50 
n 77 122 179 433 811 
White females 
DEN 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.21 0.10 
Hourly earnings 6.91 6.78 6.43 6.13 6.59 
Schooling 13.24 13.34 12.59 12.28 12.89 
Experience 16.88 16.88 19.07 19.48 18.00 
Tenure 4.76 5.52 5.65 5.39 5.31 
Union 0.13 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.19 
Married 0.57 0.58 0.59 0.58 0.58 
Full time 0.70 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.72 
Large SMSA 0.38 0.38 0.33 0.26 0.34 
n 2,490 2,311 2,184 2,031 9,016 
Black females 
DEN 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.29 0.20 
Hourly earnings 6.81 7.52 6.86 5.52 6.17 
Schooling 13.05 13.68 12.51 11.73 12.26 
Experience 13.90 17.12 18.49 21.89 19.82 
Tenure 5.48 7.41 6.42 7.35 6.98 
Union 0.26 0.41 0.31 0.28 0.30 
Married 0.40 0.33 0.42 0.41 0.40 
Full time 0.74 0.85 0.83 0.77 0.79 
Large SMSA 0.72 0.62 0.64 0.38 0.50 
n 93 120 199 551 963 
DEN = number of black workers divided by sum of white and black workers in individual's industry-occupation-region (lOR) cell; Hourly 
earnings = usual weekly earnings divided by usual hours worked per week; Schooling = years of schooling completed; Experience = Age 
Schooling - 5; Tenure = years on current job; Union = 1 if covered by a collective bargaining agreement; Married = 1 if married, spouse 
present; Fulltime = 1 if usual hours worked per week 2: 35; and Large SMSA = 1 if worker resides in CPS-designated SMSA. 
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III. Racial Density, Black and White Earnings, 
and the Wage Gap 
In order to calculate the racial wage gap and examine the 
effect of racial composition on earnings, we estimate for each of the four 
racial/ gender groups wage equations taking the following general form: 
(1) ln Wi = �(3kXik + -yDENi + ei, 
where ln Wi is the natural log of hourly earnings for individual i; Xk con­
sists of X1 = 1 and k - 1 variables measuring personal characteristics, 
job characteristics, and region; (3k includes a constant and k - 1 coeffi­
cients corresponding to variables in X; DEN is the ratio of black to white 
plus black employment and 'Y is its coefficient; and e is a error term 
assumed to have zero mean and constant variance. A value of 'Y < 0 
implies that wages for a demographic group decrease with respect to 
racial density, ceteris paribus, while 'Y > 0 implies the opposite. Because 
the relationship between ln Wand DEN is found to be nonlinear, esti­
mates also are provided in which DEN and DENSQ (density squared) 
are included. 
Included in Xk are years of schooling completed; years of potential 
experience (proxied by age minus schooling minus five) and its square; 
years of tenure on the current job and its square; and dummies for union 
status, marital status, full-time status, residence in a large SMSA, firm 
size (4), industry (13), occupation (5), and region (8).4 
The logarithmic racial wage gap (calculated separately for males and 
females) can be decomposed into explained and unexplained portions. 
Separating that portion of the gap owing to differences in mean DEN, 
and letting superscripts w and b represent white and black, respectively, 
the decomposition then becomes (dropping subscript k):5 
(2) ln ww - ln wb = [�(3w(.xw - .X'h)] 
+ [�([3w _ (3b)Xb + (-yw _ -yh)DENh] 
+ [-yw(DENw- DENh)]. 
Here the bars represent means and the total logarithmic wage gap is 
decomposed into an explained portion enclosed in the first set of brack-
4. A program designating tape location and creation of all variables from the CPS is avail­
able from the authors on request. Dummies measuring establishment size are not included 
even though both company and establishment size affect wages (Brown and Medoff 1989). 
Because they are collinear, omission of establishment size (with firm size included) does 
not bias the remaining coefficients in the model. 
5. As is well known, no single decomposition is unique. Nor does the unexplained compo­
nent necessarily correspond to demand-side labor market discrimination. See Oaxaca (1973) 
for an early exposition on the measurement of wage differentials. 
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ets, an unexplained portion enclosed in the middle set of brackets, and a 
portion associated with differences in racial composition enclosed in the 
third set of brackets. The explained portion is that accounted for by 
differences in measurable characteristics evaluated with white coefficient 
estimates, the unexplained portion is that owing to differences between 
the white and black wage structure (coefficients) evaluated at black 
means, and the portion from racial composition is that owing to differ­
ences in mean DEN evaluated at white coefficient values (interpretation 
of this latter component is provided in Section IV). If (-yw - -yb) > 0 then 
the unexplained wage gap widens with respect to DEN; if negative the 
gap decreases with DEN. 
The choice of white coefficients and black means in the decomposition 
shown in (2) seems appropriate since a nondiscriminatory wage structure 
should most closely resemble that currently observed for whites. Neu­
mark (1988) shows that the Oaxaca estimators are special cases of a more 
general decomposition in which the critical issue is the choice of the 
no-discrimination wage structure (f3). He suggests an alternative estima­
tor in which f3 is determined by a pooled (white and black) regression. 
Results presented here will be highly similar to this alternative estimator 
since the coefficients from white wage equations are very close to those 
from pooled regressions (any sensitivity to the choice of weights will be 
noted subsequently). 
Equations (1) and (2) can be compared to the more typical Equations 
(1') and (2') below, which do not include the racial composition variable 
DEN: 
(1') In Wi = �f3kXik + ei, 
(2') In ww - In Wb = �f3w(_Xw - _Xb) + �(f3w - f3b)_Xb. 
Subsequent comparison of (2) with (2') will indicate the extent to which 
omission of DEN affects conventional estimates of the racial wage differ­
ential. And letting d represent a logarithmic wage differential, the per­
centage differential can be approximated by [exp(d) - 1] 100 (Giles 1982). 
Table 2 presents full regression results from Equation (1) for each of 
the four racial/gender groups. We forgo discussion of the coefficients on 
variables in X, and concentrate attention on the DEN coefficients. These 
are found to be negative and significant for both white and black males, 
indicating that wages for both races decrease significantly as the percent­
age of black workers in a labor market increases (standard errors may be 
biased downward owing to the matching of grouped to individual data). 
Wages among white males are estimated to decrease 51.9 percent as we 
move from an entirely white to an entirely black workplace, while the 
corresponding figure for black wages is 39.2 percent (calculated by 
610 The Journal of Human Resources 
Table 2 
Regression Results, by Racial/Gender Group 
White Black White Black 
Variable Males Males Females Females 
DEN -0.731 -0.498 -0.165 -0.269 
(9.39) (2.54) (2.20) (1.67) 
Schooling 0.044 0.023 0.040 0.032 
(25.05) (3.44) (19.37) (5.70) 
Ex per 0.025 0.016 0.012 0.008 
(19.48) (3.53) (10.44) (2.47) 
Exper2/100 -0.043 -0.021 -0.024 -0.014 
(16.07) (2.39) (9.48) (2.09) 
Tenure 0.018 0.013 0.025 0.023 
(13.23) (2.57) (15.63) (5.12) 
Tenure2/100 -0.036 - 0.032 -0.053 -0.054 
(8.35) (1.95) (9.28) (3.59) 
Union 0.074 0.077 0.033 0.070 
(8.18) (2.34) (3.16) (2.72) 
Married 0.093 0.027 0.012 -0.008 
(10.04) (0.86) (1.51) (0.36) 
Full time 0.117 0.201 0.079 0.077 
(8.34) (4.32) (8. 71) (2.52) 
Large SMSA 0.083 0.100 0.096 0.110 
(9.96) (3.03) (11.18) (4.41) 
Firm size (4) yes yes yes yes 
Industry (13) yes yes yes yes 
Occupation (5) yes yes yes yes 
Region (8) yes yes yes yes 
R2 0.526 0.455 0. 474 0.494 
n 10,776 811 9,016 963 
I tl in parentheses. Dependent variable is In W. All variables are defined in Table I. Num-
bers in parentheses following firm size, industry, occupation, and region indicate number 
of dummy variables included in regression equations. 
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[exp('y) - 1] 100, where 'Y is the coefficient on DEN). Of course, entirely 
black lOR groups are not represented in our data. More realistically, we 
might ask how white and black wages are estimated to change as the 
racial composition of jobs for each group of workers moves toward equal­
ity (this is similar to the question asked by Bergmann (1971)). Mean DEN 
for our entire sample of workers is .098. For white males, an increase in 
DEN from their current .083 to .098 percent is associated with a decrease 
in their wages by an estimated' 1.1 percent ([exp(-yw(.098 - .083)) -
1] 100, where 'Y is the relevant coefficient on DEN), whereas for black 
males a change in DEN from their current .168 to .098 is associated with 
an estimated 3.5 percent wage gain ([exp(-yb(.098 - .168)) - 1] 100). 
The evidence for females indicates weaker and less significant relation­
ships between wages and DEN than those observed for males, although 
the qualitative results are similar. The estimated impact for white women 
of a change to job markets with average density is effectively zero, since 
their mean DEN approximately equals the total sample mean. For black 
women, a change in DEN from .198 to .098 is estimated to increase wages 
by 2.7 percent ([exp(-yh(.098 - .198)) - 1] 100). 
Table 3 provides evidence of differences in DEN coefficients for each 
of the four demographic groups when the samples are segmented by age, 
location in the South, and schooling. We will refer to these findings subse­
quently as results are interpreted in Section IV. The negative effect of 
racial density on black wages is found to be restricted to young workers 
(ages 16-34), whereas negative density effects on white wages are large 
for both age groups (but somewhat larger for older whites). The youth 
sample (ages 16-23) results allow comparison with Ragan and Tremblay 
(1988), who utilized a sample of 15-23 year olds from the NLS. Although 
sample sizes are small, the substantial differences in results between 
those for the youth sample and those obtained for broader groups suggest 
that care must be exercised before generalizing youth results to the gen­
eral population. For all four demographic groups, the negative effect of 
density on wages is larger for more highly schooled groups. For blacks, 
the density effect is much smaller for those with less than a high school 
degree; for whites, the negative effect of racial density increases with 
each level of schooling. Finally, for all except black females, the negative 
density effect is substantially larger among workers outside the South 
than for workers in the South, the difference being particularly large for 
black males. Note that the findings reported in Table 3 overlap to some 
extent. More highly schooled workers are more likely to be young and 
reside outside the South, and DEN coefficients are most negative where 
blacks have low representation (this latter pattern suggests a nonlinear 
relationship between In Wand DEN). 
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Table 3 
DEN Coefficients from Segmented Regressions by Age, Schooling, and 
Region, by Racial/Gender Group 
White Black White Black 
Group Males Males Females Females 
Ages 35-64 -0.890 -0.007 -0.273 0.017 
(7.98) (0.02) (2.50) (0.07) 
[5,389] [451] [4,332] [495] 
Ages 16-34 -0.586 -0.716 -0.183 -0.572 
(5.42) (2.70) (1.78) (2.54) 
[5,387] [360] [4,684] [468] 
Ages 16-23 -0.374 -1.703 0.051 -0.093 
(2.37) (2.44) (0.33) (0.25) 
[1 ,773] [91] [1 ,636] [120] 
Schooling < 12 -0.308 -0.010 - 0.058 0.006 
(2.18) (0.03) (0.39) (0.02) 
[2,034] [268] [1 ,238] [238] 
Schooling = 12 -0.566 -0.763 - 0.138 -0.429 
(4.65) (2.42) (1.29) (1.80) 
[4,075] [310] [4,147] [404] 
Schooling > 12 -1.209 -0.762 - 0. 186 -0.492 
(7.91) (1.80) (1.16) (1.10) 
[4,667] [233] [3,631] [321] 
Non-South - 1.444 -2.151 - 0.549 -0.175 
(10.20) (3.27) (4.32) (0.41) 
[7,785] [333] [6,589] [384] 
South -0.544 -0.320 -0.255 -0.515 
(4.52) (1.41) (2.09) (2.09) 
[2,991] [478] [2,427] [579] 
ltl in parentheses. Sample sizes in brackets. Other included variables are Schooling, Ex-
per and Exper2, Tenure and Tenure2, Union, Married, Fulltime, Large SMSA, and sets 
of dummies for firm size, industry, occupation, and region. The regression results for 
ages 16-23 facilitate comparison with Ragan and Tremblay (1988). 
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The robustness of the wage-density relationship is probed in several 
ways. Wage equations with a correction for selectivity bias are estimated 
(details are available on request). Following criteria suggested by Naka­
mura and Nakamura (1990), coefficients on DEN and adjusted R2s are 
found to be highly similar with and without the selectivity adjustment. 
Thus, inferences based on previously presented results are unaffected by 
the selectivity bias. In further work not shown, we estimated weighted 
regressions with sample sizes of the /OR cells as weights. Again, results 
are highly similar to those presented in the paper. 
We next examine the robustness of the density results, as well as at­
tempt to infer the routes through which racial composition affects wages, 
by estimating density coefficients using twelve alternative specifications. 
Specifications differ by variables included and functional form of the wa­
ge-density relationship. To examine nonlinearities in the log wage-density 
relationship, the model is estimated in quadratic form, with DEN and 
DENSQ as right-hand-side variables.6 Results from both functional forms 
are shown in Table 4. Line I contains results from models with only the 
racial composition variables included, line 2 results are for models adding 
all personal characteristics and firm size variables, line 3 adds industry 
dummies to line 2, line 4 adds occupation dummies to line 2, line 5 adds 
regional and the SMSA dummies to line 2, and line 6 includes all vari­
ables. 
The change in coefficients between lines I and 2 of Table 4 makes it 
evident that some of the simple correlation between wages and racial 
composition results from differences in personal characteristics corre­
lated with DEN. The addition of industry (line 3) or region (line 5) dum­
mies to the model has relatively little additional impact on 'Yw or 'Yb· 
By contrast, addition of occupation dummies substantially decreases the 
estimated impact of DEN (note the similarity of lines 4 and 6). Much of 
the simple correlation of wages with the racial composition of labor mar­
kets appears to result from differences in personal characteristics and 
broad occupational differences correlated with DEN. Jobs with higher 
proportions of black workers tend to have lower levels of wage-enhancing 
characteristics and to be in lower-paying occupational categories. The 
6. The quadratic form has the undesirable property that DEN is estimated to have positive 
effects on wages at very high density levels; however, these levels are well outside the 
observed value for most workers. A double log form performed similarly to the quadratic 
(in terms of inferences and goodness-of-fit), but it has the drawback that ln(DEN) is not 
defined at zero density. Although only a few of our cells have zero density, more disaggre­
gated measures of density would have a substantial number of job cells with no black 
workers. 
Table 4 
Racial Density Coefficients, by Specification and Racial/Gender Group 
Specification 
Males 
1. Density only 
2. Line (1) plus individual and firm char­
acteristics 
3. Line (2) plus industry dummies 
4. Line (2) plus occupation dummies 
5. Line (2) plus regional dummies and 
large SMSA 
6. Line (5) plus industry and occupation 
dummies 
"Yw 
-1.683 
(23.43) 
-1.076 
(19.18) 
-1.086 
(19.00) 
-0.727 
(12.23) 
-1.241 
(18.76) 
-0. 731 
(9.39) 
"Yb "Yw 
_
 
"Yb 
-1.582 -0.102 
(10.69) (0.59) 
-1.099 0.023 
(8.58) (0.17) 
-1.216 0.130 
(8.96) (0.91) 
-0.861 0.134 
(6.13) (0.89) 
-0.840 -0.401 
(5.54) (2.46) 
-0.498 - 0.234 
(2.54) (1.14) 
0\ ....... 
.j::.. 
>-3 
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-2.363 2.077 - 3.136 3.281 
(13.39) ( 4.22) (6.23) (3.23) 
- 2.134 3. 210 - 2.831 3.631 
(15.71) (8.54) (6.66) (4.27) 
-2.155 3. 169 -3.200 4.182 
(15.66) (8.54) (7 .47) (4.88) 
-1.758 3.065 -2.270 2.890 
(12.71) (8.25) (5.07) (3.31) 
-2.480 3.529 -2.395 3.041 
(16.61) (9.24) (4.89) (3.34) 
-1.878 2.917 - 1.908 2.559 
(10.88) (7 .44) (3.34) (2.62) 
Females 
1. Density only - 1.044 - 1.179 0.135 - 0.690 - 0. 866 - 1.586 0.642 
(16.28) (14.02) (1.18) (4.74) (2.71) (5.56) (1.49) 
2. Line (1) plus individual and firm char- 0.569 - 0.663 0.094 - 0.847 0. 678 - 1.763 1.791 
acteristics (10.72) (8.04) (0.90) (7.09) (2. 60) (7.08) (4.67) 
3. Line (2) plus industry dummies - 0.789 - 0.943 0.155 - 1.817 2.442 -2.349 2.532 
(13.96) (9.22) (1.24) (14.68) (9 .33) (8.41) (5.40) 
4. Line (2) plus occupation dummies - 0.115 - 0.391 0.276 - 0. 183 0.163 - 1.081 1.058 
(2.06) (4. 02) (2.33) (1.52) (0.64) (3.82) (2.60) 
5. Line (2) plus regional dummies and - 0.499 - 0. 489 - 0.010 - 0.644 0.332 - 1.387 1.344 
large SMSA (8.28) (5.06) (0.09) (4.95) (1.25) (4.74) (3.25) 
6. Line (5) plus industry and occupation - 0.165 - 0.269 0.104 - 0.740 1.145 - 1.318 1.490 
dummies (2.20) (1.67) (0.55) (4.66) (4.11) (3.10) (2.66) 
It I in parentheses. Superscripts wand b represent white and black, respectively; 'I are coefficients on DEN; and <!>1 and <!>2 are coefficients on 
DEN and DENSQ, respectively. The term 'lw - 'lb and its t-ratio are obtained from a stacked regression in which race is interacted with all 
explanatory variables. 
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racial composition of labor markets continues to be significantly related 
to hourly earnings, however, even following control for the occupational, 
industrial, and regional structure. 
Although wages for all demographic groups are found to decrease with 
respect to racial density, no conclusive evidence is found that the racial 
wage gap varies systematically with respect to racial composition. Racial 
differences in the DEN coefficients shown in Table 4 ()'w - )'b) do not 
display a consistent pattern and are not statistically significant. Taking 
the point estimates in line 6 at face value, however, the results would 
imply that the male racial gap narrows and the female gap widens with 
density. 
The quadratic specification with DEN and DENSQ indicates that the 
relationship between In Wand racial density is nonlinear, with log wages 
decreasing with respect to DEN at a decreasing rate. Such a pattern is 
evident for all demographic groups. The coefficients shown on line 6 of 
Table 4 imply that wages reach a minimum with respect to DEN at density 
levels of .32, .37, .32, and .44 for white males, black males, white females, 
and black females, respectively. These density levels are very high rela­
tive to mean density among these groups (.08, .17, . 10, and .20, respec­
tively). The quadratic results suggest that the marginal wage effect of 
racial density is small for workers in jobs with relatively high concentra­
tions of black workers.7 
We next decompose the racial wage gap into components that are ex­
plained, unexplained, and owing to differences in racial composition (see 
Equation 2). These results are presented in Table 5. Letting ln ww -
ln Wb be the total racial logarithmic wage gap, the differential explained 
by racial differences in the X's is L(1w(gw - X b). The unexplained differ­
ential (a measure of discrimination) is [L((1w - (1b)X b + ()'w -
-:-/)DENh], representing differences by race in the wage structure. The 
term 'Yw(DENw - DENb) measures wage differences resulting from dif­
ferences in DEN. As discussed in the next section, this third component 
may result in part from discrimination, and in part from quality differ­
ences (interpretation of )'w-)'h, included in the discrimination component, 
is not clear-cut). 
As seen in Table 5, the unadjusted or total racial wage gap is .226 for 
males and .047 for females. Much of the wage gap is unexplained, re-
7. Letting <j:>1 and <j:>2 be the coefficients on DEN and DENSQ, respectively, the density 
levels at which wages are minimized are calculated by setting a ln W/aDEN = <1:>1 + 
2<j:>2DEN = 0, and, solving for DEN by - <1:>1/2<1:>2• Andrew Weiss has suggested that a 
minimum wage law (or other floor on wages) may lead both to a nonlinear density relation­
ship and a weaker relationship in the South, since wages cannot fall in many jobs with high 
DEN and low wages. 
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suiting from differences in regression parameters, or associated with dif­
ferences in DEN. Focusing first on line 4, over 40 percent of the male 
racial gap and over two-thirds of the female gap cannot be accounted for 
by differences in racial density or measured characteristics. Even after 
controlling in detail for measured characteristics and industry, occupa­
tion, and regional dummies, approximately a third of the male and female 
racial wage gap is associated with differences in the racial composition 
of labor markets. Addition of the racial density variable to a sparse speci­
fication sharply reduces estimates of discrimination (compare the unex­
plained gaps in lines 1 and 3), but unexplained gaps are reduced only 
moderately by the addition of DEN when there exist detailed controls 
(compare lines 2 and 4). We of course have more confidence in the de­
composition analysis for men than for women, since the small racial wage 
gap among women makes the decomposition highly sensitive to small 
changes in coefficients and means. 8 
In summary, the racial composition of jobs is found to be an important 
wage determinant for white and black workers, and differences in mean 
density between black and white workers helps account for a nontrivial 
portion of the racial wage gap. If wage differences attributable to racial 
composition are not the result of discrimination, then previous estimates 
of racial discrimination (the unexplained gap) have not been seriously 
biased, at least those from studies that have included detailed controls 
for industry, occupation, and region. On the other hand, the studies have 
ignored what appears to be an important determinant of white and black 
wage rates, at least some portion of which is likely to result from discrimi­
nation. We now turn to the question not addressed in our analysis thus 
far-why wages vary systematically with the racial composition of labor 
markets? 
IV. Interpretation of Results and Theories of 
Labor Market Discrimination 
The wages of both white and black workers have been 
shown to decrease with respect to racial density, while the racial wage 
gap has not been found to vary systematically with density. Can these 
results tell us anything about the mechanism through which racial compo-
8. Inferences are broadly similar using a decomposition with black coefficient weights. For 
example, the estimated explained, unexplained, and composition gaps in line 4 for males 
are 0.053, 0.131, and 0.042, respectively; in line 5 they are 0.023, 0. 117, and 0.086. As stated 
previously in the text, we believe the use of white weights is preferable since it should be 
closest to a "nondiscriminatory" wage structure. 
Table 5 
Decomposition of Racial Wage Differentials, by Gender 
Total Racial Explained 
Specification Wage Gap Wage Gap 
-
Males 
1. All individual and firm characteristics 0.226 0.043 
(19.0%) 
2. Line (1) plus industry, occupation, and regional 0.226 0.103 
controls (45.6%) 
3. Line (1) plus DEN 0.226 0.035 
(15.5%) 
4. Line (2) plus DEN 0.226 0.066 
(29.2%) 
5. Line (2) plus DEN and DENSQ 0.226 0.049 
(21.7%) 
Gap Due 
Unexplained to Racial 
Wage Gap Composition 
0.183 
(81.0%) 
0.123 
(54.4%) 
0.103 .088 
(45.6%) (38.9%) 
0.098 .062 
(43.4%) (27.4%) 
0.104 .073 
(46.0%) (32.3%) 
0\ 
-
00 
...., 
::r' (D 
c....., 
0 
c ..., 
= 
2:.. 
0 ......, 
� 
c 
s 
§ 
:;a (D "' 
0 
c 
(l (D "' 
Females 
1. All individual and firm characteristics 0.047 -0.039 0.086 
( -83.0%) (183.0%) 
2. Line (1) plus industry, occupation, and regional 0.047 0.009 0.038 
controls (19.1%) (80.9%) 
3. Line (1) plus DEN 0.047 -0.041 0.038 .050 
( - 87.2%) (80.9%) (106.4%) 
4. Line (2) plus DEN 0.047 0. 001 0.030 .016 
(2.1%) (63.8%) (34.0%) 
5. Line (2) plus DEN and DENSQ 0.047 - 0.009 0.038 .018 
( - 19.1%) (80.9%) (38.3%) 
See Equation (2) in text. The total racial wage gap is In ww - In Wb. The explained wage gap is calculated by Li3w(gw - Xb). The unex­
plained wage gap is calculated by [L(i3w - i3b)Xb + ('Yw - 'Yb)DENb] in lines 3 and 4 and by [L(i3w - i3b)Xb + (<!>! - <J>t)DENb + (<!>2 - <!>�) 
DENSQb] in line 5. The gap due to differences in the racial composition of /OR-cells is measured by 'Yw(DENw - DENb) in lines 3 and 4 and 
by <J>I(DENw - DENb) + <J>2(DENSQw - DENSQb) in line 5. The numbers in parentheses represent the percentage each component contrib­
utes to the total differential (these may not add up to 100 percent owing to rounding error). 
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sition affects wages, or the sources of discrimination? Although our work 
does not provide a rigorous test of any specific theory of discrimination, 
the evidence does shed light on the plausibility of alternative theories. 
Among the most widely recognized theories or descriptions of labor mar­
ket discrimination are taste models identifying the preferences of employ­
ers, employees, and consumers as sources of discrimination; models of 
statistical discrimination focusing on imperfect and costly information 
about worker productivities; and the "crowding" hypothesis, wherein 
groups of workers are restricted to particular job markets .9 These alterna­
tive models of discrimination may provide different predictions about the 
signs of the racial density coefficients in the white and black wage equa­
tions (-yw and -yh, respectively) and their difference (-yw - -yh). A positive 
value for (-yw - -yh) indicates that the racial wage gap widens with density. 
The evidence presented here indicates that -yw and -yb are negative, while 
(-yw - -yb) is indeterminate and close to zero. 
Taste models of employer discrimination predict that employers with 
a taste for discrimination are willing to pay a premium for white workers 
over equally productive black workers or, similarly, pay blacks less than 
equivalent whites to receive the same net "product." 10 As long as the 
number of discriminatory employers and size of the black workforce in 
the labor market are relatively small, there will be no wage differential. 
Rather, blacks will work for nondiscriminatory employers, while discrim­
inatory employers will hire all whites. But as the relative size of the black 
labor force increases, employer discrimination will lead to a decrease in 
relative black wages and an increase in relative white wages. If employer 
discrimination were the major explanation for racial wage differences, 
the wage gap should widen as the density of black workers in a labor 
market increases. Yet our results show that white wages decrease with 
respect to density and that there is no significant relationship between 
the gap and racial composition. The empirical results provide no support 
for the employer taste model. 
9. See Becker (1971) for a presentation of neoclassical taste models. Arrow (1973) and 
Phelps (1972) for development of early models of statistical discrimination, Bergmann (1971) 
for development of the crowding theory as applied to race. and Cain (1986) for a detailed 
survey and analysis of the discrimination literature. 
10. We ignore the distinction between nepotism and discrimination models (Goldberg 1982). 
In the former, whites are paid more than their marginal products. whereas in the latter, 
blacks are paid less than their marginal products. If marginal products were approximated 
by the predicted wage from a regression, with racial density set to zero. a nepotism model 
would predict that white wages increase with respect to density. whereas the discrimination 
model would predict that black wages fall with density. If both nepotism and discrimination 
are at work, white wages should rise and black wages decline with density. Regardless. the 
racial gap should widen with density, and white wages should not decrease with density. 
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Let us assume that employee discrimination is characterized by the 
preferences of some white employees not to work with blacks. White 
workers must receive a premium to work with blacks and, quite possibly, 
this premium increases with the proportion of black workers.11 If the 
number of prejudiced workers is small and there exist opportunities to 
work in segregated work environments, no wage differential will result. 
But as the number of prejudiced workers and the proportion of blacks in 
the workforce increase, a white premium is more likely. Black wages 
should be little affected by racial density if they are indifferent about the 
race of coworkers. Thus, employee discrimination leads to the prediction 
of higher white wages and a larger racial wage gap in labor markets with 
higher densities of black workers. No such evidence is found. 
Consumer preferences with respect to race may also generate wage 
differentials. If the number of such consumers and the size of the black 
workforce are small no differential is likely. But if white consumer dis­
crimination is widespread and segregation of blacks into invisible jobs is 
costly, white premiums and black penalties should increase, and the ra­
cial wage gap should widen, as the proportion of the workforce that is 
black increases. Again, our evidence lends no support to the consumer 
tastes model as an important force in wage determination. 12 
Although we find no evidence to support the taste models of discrimina­
tion, it must be pointed out that these are neither overly strong nor direct 
tests of the models. More fundamentally, most U. S. labor markets may 
have too few black workers for racial wage differentials associated with 
tastes to be evident. If there are sufficient numbers of nondiscriminatory 
employers, employees, and consumers, most black workers can be hired 
at prevailing wage rates with no black-white market differential. This 
being said, if employer, employee, and consumer tastes were the primary 
transmission mechanism for otherwise unexplained racial wage differen­
tials, it is likely that we would observe a positive relationship of white 
wage rates and the racial gap with respect to the racial density of labor 
markets. We do not. 
Statistical discrimination results when there is imperfect information 
about individual worker productivities. The well-known Aigner-Cain 
II. Becker predicts a wage premium for workers in an integrated workplace regardless of 
the extent of integration, whereas Arrow models the size of the premium to be an increasing 
function of the proportion of workers of the opposite race. Ragan and Tremblay (1988, p. 
124) provide a clear exposition on this point and attempt to distinguish empirically among 
these alternatives. 
12. The racial density of lOR cells will be at least weakly correlated with the racial makeup 
of a firm's customer base, making interpretation of -y"' and -yb less straightforward. It is 
unlikely that such effects are substantial. 
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model of statistical discrimination (see Cain 1986) assumes an equivalent 
distribution of abilities among white and black workers, but "indicator" 
characteristics (for example, years of schooling) are less reliable mea­
sures of productivity for blacks than for whites. In this case, there will 
be no average group discrimination; high ability whites will be paid more 
than high ability blacks, while low ability whites will be paid less than 
low ability blacks. There is no obvious prediction about a relationship 
between white and black wages and the racial composition of labor mar­
kets, unless it is assumed that white and black workers must be treated 
similarly within job markets. In that case, predominately black work­
places should exhibit lower wage dispersion and a structure of earnings 
in which the returns associated with indicator variables are lower than in 
predominately white workplaces, but average wages should be similar (in 
other words, smaller slope coefficients but a larger intercept). 
Alternative models of statistical discrimination can be developed, al­
though it is unlikely that any of these could be the primary determinant 
of the wage-density relationship. For example, note that employers ob­
serve the race of applicants/employees and believe it to be correlated 
with productivity. Because the number of black applicants and workers 
is substantially lower than the number of whites, most employers observe 
a higher relative dispersion of productivities among black than among 
white employees. Stated alternatively, the small sample sizes of black 
employees make it more difficult for employers to predict accurately 
black worker productivities. As the relative size of the black workforce 
increases, uncertainty about worker productivities should decrease. As­
suming risk averse employers (unlike Aigner and Cain), black wages thus 
should increase as black density increases (in other words, as uncertainty 
decreases), while white wage rates should be largely unaffected. The 
racial wage gap therefore will be smaller in high density labor markets. 
Again, direct support is not found for this version of statistical discrimina­
tion, since black wages decrease with respect to racial density and the 
racial wage gap does not vary systematically with density.U Consistent 
with this model of statistical discrimination, however, is the finding that 
density has its most negative effect where there are relatively fewer 
blacks-outside the South and among highly schooled workers. And evi­
dence indicates that the negative wage-density relationship is substantial 
for young but not older black workers, consistent with the notion that as 
workers and employers increase contact with each other, productivity is 
13. Whatley (1990) presents a statistical discrimination model relying on similar arguments 
and provides historical evidence based on the records of companies in Atlanta and Cincin­
nati during 1914-18. 
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revealed and uncertainty plays less of a role (or as expressed below, 
communication costs are reduced). 
Implications from Lang's (1986) "language" model of discrimination 
may be similar to those presented above for the uncertainty hypothesis. 
Following Lang, blacks and whites display different language and com­
munication patterns; minority workers who do not acquire majority lan­
guage patterns are penalized in the labor market to compensate for the 
higher communication costs facing employers. A high density of black 
workers may signify greater contact between blacks and whites and a 
larger accumulated stock of communication capital. In this case, blacks 
should fare better in job markets with large numbers of black workers 
(and employers). On the other hand, it could be argued that blacks who 
do not acquire majority language patterns may be crowded into job mar­
kets with high densities of black workers and high communication costs 
between white and black workers and with employers. Blacks who ac­
quire majority language patterns receive a return on these skills by being 
able to acquire jobs in predominately white and noncrowded labor mar­
kets.14 As discussed below, our statistical results are broadly consistent 
with the crowding model. 
Crowding models of the labor market have been applied most fre­
quently as an explanation for the gender wage gap and occupational dif­
ferences in employment. Crowding is not so much a theory of discrimina­
tion as it is an outcome through which discrimination is manifest and in 
turn affects the wage structure. As applied to race, the crowding models 
would emphasize historical and discriminatory forces that have limited 
the mobility of black workers into some job markets, while crowding 
them into others (Higgs 1977, Whatley 1990) . Consistent with the hypoth­
esis of racial crowding (as well as other explanations) is the finding that 
there are substantial differences among blacks in desired and actual occu­
pational attainment (Gill 1989) . 
Crowding should cause an increase in labor supply and depress equilib­
rium wages for both white and black workers in crowded job markets 
open to blacks, while having no predictable effect on the racial wage gap. 
Our results are largely consistent with the crowding model, since both 
white and black wage rates vary inversely with racial density. But there 
are unanswered questions. First, why would white workers not facing 
discriminatory barriers to other job markets remain where wages are 
lower? It is likely, therefore, that white workers who remain in racially 
crowded labor markets are on average less able or mobile than white 
counterparts in jobs with low concentrations of black workers. Second, 
14. For evidence that language proficiency plays an important role in the earnings of His­
panics. see McManus. Gould, and Welch (1983). 
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is the racial crowding explanation for lower wages (in other words, an 
increased labor supply) plausible, given relatively low /OR-cell racial 
densities even in jobs held by black workers? Admittedly, we would find 
the crowding explanation more compelling were we to observe negative 
wage effects primarily at high racial density levels (instead, white and 
black wages decrease at a decreasing rate with respect to density). Our 
lOR cells aggregate across heterogeneous job markets, however, so that 
as DEN increases, even at relatively low levels, we are likely to be cap­
turing an increasing number of predominately black (in other words, 
crowded) jobs. 
Finally, if crowding is the primary explanation for the wage-density 
relationship, we expect coefficients on DEN to be most negative among 
black workers for whom an a priori expectation of racial crowding is 
strong. Earlier, we provided estimates in which DEN coefficients were 
allowed to vary with respect to age, schooling, and region. It was found 
that the negative effects of racial composition on black workers were 
restricted to the young, males in the non-South, and those with at least 
a high school degree. These are not the groups of black workers for whom 
racial crowding should be most severe. Older black workers have faced 
greater employment barriers than have younger black workers. Young 
low-skill blacks are likely to be relocated to crowded jobs, but negative 
density effects are smallest for blacks with low schooling. And certainly 
crowding should be more severe in the South, where there is a higher 
proportion of black workers and where discrimination is believed to be 
highest (unexplained racial wage gaps are larger in the South). Yet the 
effects of racial density are smaller in the South than the non-South. For 
all these reasons, the crowding hypothesis does not appear to be an en­
tirely adequate explanation for the wage-density relationship. 
Although the wage-density relationship reflects the net outcome of 
many simultaneous forces, we believe results reported in this paper are 
consistent with a quality sorting explanation. There is likely to exist 
worker and employer sorting based on differences in job quality and 
unmeasured worker quality betweenjobs with high and low racial densi­
ties. That is, racial composition variables will be correlated with unob­
served worker and job quality measures. The fact that measurable wage­
enhancing characteristics are lower in high density markets lends support 
to this hypothesis, assuming that measurable and unmeasurable labor 
quality factors are positively correlated. 
For example, assume that jobs sort (in other words, match employers 
and workers) on observed and unobserved quality. If blacks have less 
unobserved quality owing, say, to less human capital attached to mea­
sured years of schooling and potential experience, then jobs requiring 
less skill will have relatively higher concentrations of black workers. 
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Moreover, both whites and blacks will be less productive (and paid less) 
in high density jobs, while being more productive in low density jobs. 
Although the quality sorting explanation is consistent with our findings, 
this hypothesis is not tested explicitly by our work. 15 Our finding of more 
substantial racial density effects among more highly schooled workers, 
coupled with O'Neill's (1990) finding that the racial gap in achievement 
test scores increases with schooling level, lends credence to the thesis 
that quality sorting is an important part of the explanation for a wage­
density relationship. 
The quality sorting explanation is not inconsistent with crowding (and 
other) models of discrimination. Past discrimination and differences in 
premarket skills that black and white workers traditionally brought to the 
labor market could have led to current labor market equilibria in which 
racial densities vary substantially across jobs. Markets with historically 
large concentrations of black workers are more likely to have settled 
into equilibria with lower observed and unobserved skill requirements 
(Akerlof 1976). The racial composition of jobs then has become a proxy 
for worker quality. Moreover, antidiscrimination laws and concerns 
about worker morale make it difficult to maintain racial wage differences 
within lOR cells, but do relatively little to prevent racial wage differences 
across job markets. Thus, high density job markets wherein black work­
ers receive low wages must also pay low wages to whites employed in 
those markets. Over time, selective hiring and sorting lead to equilibria 
in which we observe lower quality whites and blacks in high density 
markets and higher quality workers in low density markets. 
It is worth noting that interpretation of 'Y will differ for black and white 
workers if this description of the labor market is accurate. For whites, 
'Y w reflects the equilibrium ' 'price'' attached to omitted worker quality 
differences measured by DEN . For black workers 'Yb is a "price" for 
both quality and discrimination, since differences in DEN reflect not only 
quality differences, but also racial crowding and other forms of past and 
present discriminatory behavior associated with racial composition. By 
15 .  A longitudinal model examining wage changes of workers moving from low to high 
density markets (or vice-versa) could provide more direct evidence of unobserved quality 
differences. Besides requiring longitudinal data on individual workers, interpretation of such 
a model is not straightforward because of measurement error in change variables and the 
possibility that job change is endogenous. Preliminary work along these lines by Hirsch and 
Dave Macpherson supports the quality sorting explanation. We have also ignored what we 
consider the unlikely possibility that the wage-density relationship is the result of disequilib­
rium. That is, if blacks are less mobile owing to lower abilities and wealth, declining sectors 
will tend to have lower wages and a higher density of black workers. Such a thesis could 
be tested directly through the use of data on employment growth within /OR cells. 
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this interpretation, DEN may be regarded as a quality-related characteris­
tic for white workers, whereas for black workers neither DEN nor 'Yb 
have a clear a priori interpretation. 
V. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have shown that the racial composition of 
labor markets is an important determinant of wage rates. The wages of 
both white and black workers decrease with respect to racial density, 
measured by the ratio of black to the sum of white and black workers 
within industry-occupation-region cells. Evidence of a wage-density rela­
tionship is particularly clear-cut for males. 
Although we have documented an important regularity in the U . S. 
labor market, the explanation for this relationship is not clear. Our evi­
dence does not appear to be consistent with either taste models of dis­
crimination or most models of statistical discrimination. The results are 
consistent with the hypothesis of quality sorting and partially consistent 
with theories of racial crowding and language discrimination. But our 
evidence does not allow us to distinguish conclusively between these 
alternative, although not mutually exclusive, views of the labor market. 
Whatever the explanation, the racial composition of labor markets ap­
pears to be an important factor in determining wage rates for white and 
black workers. It is hoped that future research can examine further this 
relationship with new sets of data and alternative racial composition mea­
sures, and can identify more precisely the routes through which racial 
composition and wage rates are related. 
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